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INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s and 1970s the Times Educational Supplement (TES) and Education  
carried  detailed  reports  on a  weekly basis  about  local  policy plans,  decisions  and 
reactions to comprehensive education proposals. In one important sense the social, 
economic,  demographic and school-specific  variables  in any given local  education 
authority (LEA) were unique, but at a general level the arguments became familiar. 
Quotes from those involved in the recent parental campaign to decide the future of 
Ripon Grammar School reveal the endurance of these arguments, even if Web sites 
have replaced placards and marches. Supporters of comprehensive education continue 
to argue that eleven-plus selection procedures are unreliable, take no account of late 
developers and condemn the majority of children to schools which are, in comparison 
to the grammars, unsatisfactory. But any future decisions to be taken about England’s 
164  remaining  grammar  schools  rest  exclusively  with  parents,  while  secondary 
schools  themselves  now  have  opportunities,  if  they  wish  to  pursue  them,  of 
developing  a  specialist  (and  selective)  character.  Having  entered  the  twenty-first 
century only after  re-inventing  themselves  as  competitive  service-providers,  LEAs 
have lost many of their former powers and much of their influence over secondary 
education.  This article  recalls  (mostly)  happier times for LEAs, focusing upon the 
drive for comprehensive education in the years 1944 to 1974.
The term ‘comprehensive’ evolved during the Second World War as a replacement 
for the ‘multilateral’ school, an ‘all through’ institution for children aged 11 to 18, 
ideally purpose built on a single site. More specific early definitions were uncommon, 
although most commentators agreed that comprehensive schools needed to be large in 
order to sustain viable sixth forms. A 1947 circular from the Ministry of Education 
recommended, for example, that the minimum size of a comprehensive school should 
be 10- or 11-form entry so that it would accommodate in excess of 1,500 children 
(Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p. 61). This understanding of comprehensive education was to 
be substantially revised over the next 30 years,  mostly as a direct consequence of 
LEA, rather than central government, initiatives. 
The remainder of this paper, which draws upon research sponsored by the Spencer 
Foundation [1], is divided into five sections. The next two sections are chronological 
and survey non-selective developments at the local level over the full 30-year period. 
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Attention is then drawn to key personnel involved in LEA reorganizations, including 
the Chief Education Officer (CEO) and chair of the Education Committee.  This is 
followed by a brief discussion of local consultation and reorganization issues and, 
finally, a concluding section. 
ALTERNATIVES  TO  BIPARTISM,  TRIPARTISM  AND  THE  ELEVEN-PLUS, 
1944-62
One common misconception, even among some historians, is that the 1944 Education 
Act endorsed tripartite secondary schooling. In fact, the Act itself had nothing to say 
about how secondary schools should be organized. This was a matter that was left for 
the LEAs to decide and report to the Ministry of Education in a development plan. 
But subsequent Ministry guidance to LEAs barely acknowledged the possibility that 
an LEA might wish to establish comprehensive schools throughout its administrative 
area.  Such  schools  were  thought  to  be  possibly  appropriate  in  sparsely-populated 
areas  or  as  ‘judicious  experiments’  (Ministry  of  Education,  1945;  Ministry  of 
Education, 1947), but they were not encouraged.
When  the  development  plans  started  rolling  in,  the  Ministry  had  reason  to  be 
surprised. A 1947 survey of 54 LEA plans revealed that more than half were seeking 
to  establish  at  least  one  non-selective  school  (Simon,  1991,  p.  75).  The  Labour-
controlled London County Council (LCC) submitted the most ambitious and detailed 
scheme. The  London School Plan envisaged a total  of 103 ‘comprehensive school 
units’, comprising 67 comprehensive schools and a further 36 ‘county complements’ 
linked to existing grammar schools (LCC, 1947). Early support for comprehensives 
was not  purely an  urban,  socialist  phenomenon.  In a  predominantly  rural  area  of 
Yorkshire, for example, the Conservative-controlled West Riding LEA also initially 
favoured a fully comprehensive secondary school system (Clegg, 1965, p. 75). 
Guided  by  the  schools  inspectorate,  Ellen  Wilkinson  (1945-47)  and  George 
Tomlinson  (1947-51),  the  Education  ministers  in  Attlee’s  Labour  government, 
proceeded very cautiously.  In rural  areas  the Ministry accepted  the arguments  for 
comprehensive schools, albeit for reasons that had more to do with economics than 
with  education.  This  policy  permitted  the  West  Riding  to  open  two  11-18 
comprehensive schools during the early 1950s, while Anglesey was permitted to go 
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fully comprehensive  as  a special  case.  Elsewhere,  the Ministry sanctioned limited 
experiments in urban LEAs where wartime bomb damage had spawned new housing 
developments,  including  Bristol,  Coventry,  Leeds  and  London.  Plans  for 
comprehensive schools advanced by Middlesex and the North Riding of Yorkshire 
were rejected, however (Simon, 1991, pp. 104-9).
Eight ‘interim’ split-site London comprehensive schools, housed in the premises of 
former senior and central school buildings had been established by the end of 1949. 
Important as these schools proved to be as trail-blazers (see LCC, 1961, p. 14), they 
offered little prospect of tempting middle-class parents to abandon existing grammar 
schools. The authority’s ambitions, which continued to be invested in the creation of 
new schools to  replace selective schools, received a boost in the autumn of 1949. 
Tomlinson’s approval of a proposal to close five schools, including Eltham Grammar 
School for Girls, permitted the LCC to build its first purpose-built comprehensive, 
Kidbrooke  School,  designed  to  accommodate  2,000  girls  aged  11-18.  The 
Conservative general election victory of 1951 did not immediately seem to threaten 
these  plans,  but  in  October  1953  Florence  Horsbrugh,  Churchill’s  Minister  of 
Education,  took the extraordinary step of urging a London Conservative Women’s 
Conference to organize protests against the closure of existing schools (Simon, 1991, 
pp.  171-72).  The  TES,  edited  by  the  fiercely  anti-comprehensive  Walter  James, 
offered immediate  support for the preservation of Eltham Grammar School and in 
March  1954,  just  six  months  before  Kidbrooke  was  due  to  enrol  its  first  pupils, 
Horsbrugh announced that it would stay open. Though not at this time a supporter of 
comprehensive education, the Secretary of the Association of Education Committees 
(AEC), Sir William Alexander, was outraged by the Minister’s actions. He feared that 
the  decision  might  establish  a  precedent  for  ‘destroying  the  autonomy  of  Local 
Education Authorities in determining the appropriate use of school accommodation in 
their area and the best plan for the organisation of secondary education’ (Education  
editorial, 12 March 1954). 
Sir  David  Eccles,  Horsbrugh’s  successor,  pursued  a  more  even-handed  policy, 
allowing the establishment of new comprehensives and county complements in both 
purpose-built  accommodation  and  amalgamated  premises.  Holloway,  Mayfield, 
Parliament  Hill,  Sydenham and Wandsworth,  all  former grammar schools,  became 
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showpiece  LCC  comprehensives  during  the  mid-fifties.  While  the  eleven-plus 
continued to  operate  in  London,  however,  middle-class  parents  were able  to deny 
these schools a fully comprehensive intake. It was the same story in two other cities 
where wartime bomb damage facilitated progress. Bristol LEA established some 14 
non-selective secondary schools between 1954 and 1963, but they served working-
class  housing  estates  and,  even  in  the  locality,  they  were  rarely  described  as 
‘comprehensives’ (Keen, 1965, p. 23). Coventry’s first eight comprehensives were 
also established without closing any city grammar schools and, as in Bristol, the LEA 
continued  to  purchase  places  in  local  direct  grant  schools  throughout  this  period 
(Chinn, 1965, p. 27). A number of other LEAs managed to establish one or more 
comprehensive  schools  in  the  1950s,  but  some  held  out  against  this  strategy  of 
tokenism. In 1965 Stoke-on-Trent’s CEO, Henry Dibden, recalled that
. . . the clamour to build one comprehensive school as an experiment had 
to be countered by the argument that if you are going comprehensive you 
should  go  completely  or  not  at  all;  that  by  its  very  nature  the 
comprehensive will not harmonize with other forms. That if you had one, 
then throughout the City the 11 plus would continue to operate and you 
could not exclude children in the comprehensive neighbourhood. Some of 
the grammar type parents would opt for grammar school places. If they 
were refused and told they must all go to the comprehensive, the Minister 
of Education would over-rule the Committee as interfering with parents’ 
choice.
(Dibden, 1965, pp. 67-68)
The West Riding of Yorkshire pursued a very pragmatic approach after the Second 
World  War.  With  too  few suitable  sites  available  to  implement  an  authority-wide 
system of comprehensives the authority settled for a policy of bipartism, rather than 
tripartism (except in the districts served by the two comprehensives). But continuing 
unhappiness with the eleven-plus saw the West Riding introduce what became known 
as the ‘Thorne scheme’ from the mid-1950s. This was a means of allocating grammar 
school  places  to  the  ablest  primary  school  children  on  the  basis  of  teachers’ 
recommendations. This scheme, which was judged to be no less reliable than a formal 
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examination, was operational in two-thirds of the county by 1964 and was copied by a 
number of like-minded LEAs (Gosden and Sharp, 1978, pp. 178-79).
With  mounting  evidence  that  both  the  rationale  for  and methods  of  psychometric 
testing were flawed (for example Vernon, 1957; Yates and Pidgeon, 1957) interest 
developed ‘in the possibility of beating, at one stroke, both of the bogys which had 
hitherto  seemed  to  create  an  “either/or”  situation:  selection  at  11  and  giant 
comprehensives’ (Pedley, 1980, p. 458). One proposal, first advanced unsuccessfully 
by  Croydon  LEA  officials  in  1954,  was  a  two-tier  system  involving  11-15 
comprehensive schools followed by the possibility - for those pupils who successfully 
sat  GCE ‘O’ levels  at  age 16 -  of transferring to a  ‘junior college’  or sixth form 
college.  Leicestershire’s  Director  of  Education,  Stewart  Mason,  advanced  an 
alternative two-tier solution, the result, he later claimed, of a ‘blinding explosion’ of 
inspiration that came to him whilst shaving one morning early in 1957 (Guardian, 12 
September 1978; Jones, 1988, p. 57). This proposal was that the county’s secondary 
modern schools, re-named ‘junior high schools’, should recruit all the pupils from the 
primary schools within their catchment area. Pupils would remain at the junior high 
school for a minimum of three years before either transferring to a grammar school 
(or ‘senior high’) or continuing for a further year  at  their present school. Mason’s 
‘blinding explosion’ was hardly an original thought, however. Robin Pedley, at that 
time a Leicester University lecturer, had articulated the same idea in student seminars 
and at a meeting with Eccles at least one year earlier. Pedley, rather than Mason, was 
the true architect of the Leicestershire ‘experiment’ and ‘plan’ (Crook, 1992).
The  preservation,  albeit  with  some  re-orientation,  of  the  grammar  schools  was  a 
feature  of  the  Leicestershire  plan  that  appealed  to  a  succession  of  Conservative 
Education  ministers.  The  county’s  ‘experiment’,  which  had  been  launched  with 
amazing  speed  in  two  districts  in  September  1957,  was  immediately  declared  a 
success, both within the county and the country.  The initiative was welcomed in a 
1958  White  Paper  on  secondary  education,  but  proposals  ‘to  bring  to  an  end  an 
existing grammar school’ were said to be ‘quite another matter’. ‘It cannot be right’, 
the White Paper asserted, ‘that good existing schools should be forcibly brought to an 
end, or that parents’ freedom of choice should be so completely abolished’ (Ministry 
of  Education,  1958,  pp.  5-6).  Thereafter,  the  Ministry  continued  to  permit 
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comprehensive experiments, but looked still more favourably upon the extension of 
opportunities for secondary modern pupils to take public examinations. This policy 
was hardly a ringing endorsement of eleven-plus selection and, in all probability, it 
encouraged more LEAs to contemplate the possibilities of comprehensive schools. As 
the curriculum of the secondary modern school began to imitate that of the grammar 
school  the  rationale  for  segregation  became  less  clear  and  calls  for  a  fully 
comprehensive system grew louder.
LEA COMPREHENSIVE SCHEMES, 1963-74
As Brian Simon has argued, the experiments of the 1950s provided the background to 
the ‘breakout’ of the following decade (Simon, 1991, pp. 203-11). The local elections 
of May 1963 brought sweeping victories for Labour and provided a vital catalyst for 
the  comprehensive  movement.  Bristol,  Liverpool  and  Manchester  LEAs  quickly 
produced city-wide schemes for comprehensive reorganization, while the LCC finally 
abandoned  the  eleven-plus,  replacing  it  in  those  districts  where  grammar  schools 
continued  to  operate  by a  combination  of  teacher  assessment  and parental  choice 
(TES, 28 February 1964). A number of rural counties, including Devon, Dorset and 
Shropshire, none of them Labour-controlled,  also declared themselves in favour of 
comprehensives (Miles, 1964). A grass-roots movement was underway that demanded 
some revisionist thinking from a Conservative government that seemed destined for 
defeat at the next general election. Macmillan’s Minister of Education, Edward Boyle, 
had quietly been encouraging LEAs to look at  possibilities for softening selection 
procedures and was much more open-minded about comprehensive education than the 
majority of his parliamentary colleagues.  In a private briefing paper of July 1963, 
headed  ‘Prime  Minister’,  he  recommended  that  the  Conservative  Party  should  go 
beyond the doctrine of the 1958 White Paper and ‘make an end of the strict neutrality 
which my Department has maintained in public towards local selection methods’[2].
The  following  month  saw  Boyle  appoint  a  committee  chaired  by  Lady  Bridget 
Plowden  ‘to  consider  primary  education  in  all  its  aspects,  and  the  transition  to  
secondary  education’  (DES,  1967,  p.  iii,  author’s  emphasis).  A  widespread 
expectation  that  the  Plowden  committee  would  contest  whether  eleven,  the  age 
stipulated  by  the  1944  Education  Act,  was  the  best  age  of  transfer  to  secondary 
education  produced new thinking in  the  localities  about  the  possibilities  of  tiered 
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secondary systems that would either delay selection or abolish it altogether.  In the 
West  Riding,  Alec Clegg,  the CEO, concluded that  a three-tier  secondary system, 
using  existing  school  premises,  offered  the  only  realistic  prospect  of  satisfying 
demands  for  comprehensive  education  from  several  divisional  executives.  A 
preliminary meeting with Ministry of Education officials did not raise expectations 
that  the  age  of  transfer  could  be  waived,  but  the  authority  pressed  ahead  with  a 
proposal to create  5-9, 9-13 and 13-18 schools in several of its  districts  (TES,  11 
October  1963).  The  scheme  fitted  well  with  Boyle’s  interest  in  developing 
comprehensive education without closing grammar schools and an Education Bill was 
quickly enacted so that the West Riding could reorganize along these lines.  Other 
LEAs  watched  with  interest.  In  West  Sussex,  for  example,  County  Hall  officials 
quickly  noted  that  three-tier  schooling  would  provide  one  solution  to  a  logistical 
school  buildings  problem  in  a  rural  district.  The  prospect  of  introducing 
comprehensive education without the perceived disadvantages of huge 11-18 schools 
was an important, but secondary consideration (Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p. 141). 
Labour’s  1964 general  election  victory saw Michael  Stewart  become Secretary of 
State  for  Education  in  Harold  Wilson’s  cabinet.  He  quickly  produced  a  briefing 
document in which he argued that the transition to a predominantly comprehensive 
system could be achieved within five years, a vision that was certainly neither shared 
by Chief Inspector Percy Wilson nor by a number of senior Civil Servants at the DES 
(Dean,  1998,  p.  71;  Lawrence,  1993,  p.  46).  Stewart’s  suggestion  that  a  circular 
should be sent to each of the English and Welsh LEAs was accepted, but the cabinet  
stopped short of sanctioning legislation at this point (Stewart, 1980, p. 132).  Circular 
10/65,  published  on  14  July  1965  by  Stewart’s  successor,  Anthony  Crosland, 
requested, but did not require LEAs to submit plans to the Ministry (DES, 1965). 
Six alternative  methods  of  ‘going comprehensive’  were set  out  in  Circular  10/65. 
LEAs were free to decide, on the basis of educational preference and existing building 
stock,  whether  an  all-through  solution  –  the  favoured  option  of  Crosland  –  was 
appropriate,  or  whether  they wished to  introduce  a  tiered  system.  Of the  two-tier 
alternatives, each contemplated secondary education beginning at 11 but with transfer 
to  another  school  (or  sixth  form college)  at  the  ages  of  13,  14  or  16.  Three-tier 
comprehensive  options,  to  include  middle  schools  for  children  aged  8-12  – 
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prefiguring  the  Plowden  preference  -  and  9-13  were  also  outlined,  signalling  the 
satisfaction of the DES with the West Riding pilot.
Most  of  the  large,  Labour-controlled  urban  authorities,  including  Leeds  and 
Birmingham, shared the preference of Bristol, Liverpool, London and Manchester for 
all-through comprehensives. But in each of these cities rapid progress was hampered 
by  inadequate  building  stock,  the  need  to  consult  with  church  authorities  and 
uncertainties about future LEA relations with local direct grant schools. Long-term 
plans were often explicit,  but the absence of additional DES funding to implement 
reorganization  meant  that  ideals  had  to  be  temporarily  sacrificed.  Compromises 
invariably took the form of ‘interim’ arrangements, the phased abolition of the eleven-
plus and school amalgamations that created comprehensive schools on two or more 
sites. 
The Leicestershire experiment and plan provided a concrete example of the two-tier 
model  involving pupil  transfer  at  14.  The similar  proposal  for  transfer  at  13 was 
widely  referred  to  as  the  ‘Doncaster’  plan,  a  reference  to  a  scheme  that  had  – 
somewhat surprisingly – been accepted by the DES two months before Crosland’s 
circular was issued (TES, 21 May 1965). Both schemes, in their original form, were 
only  semi-comprehensive,  delaying  selection  and  permitting  upper-tier  secondary 
schools  to  retain  the  name ‘grammar  school’  if  it  was  so desired.  They involved 
guided parental choice at the age of transfer, prompting objections that the grammar 
schools (or ‘senior highs’) would continue to be populated by middle-class pupils and 
that  girls  would  suffer  a  relative  disadvantage.  The  most  enthusiastic  pro-
comprehensive authorities tended to shun these options, except as interim solutions. 
Middle school  possibilities,  meanwhile,  aroused interest,  but uncertainty about  the 
ideal age of transfer from the lower and middle tiers strengthened the view that LEAs 
should ‘wait for Plowden’.
A small number of Conservative LEAs indicated from the beginning that they would 
defy the circular (Crook, 1993, pp. 53-54), but rather more took the view that paying 
half-hearted attention to the Doncaster or Leicestershire model might enable them to 
meet Crosland’s demands in a fashion that involved minimal change. For example, 
Buckinghamshire County Council pledged its support for comprehensives ‘provided 
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that  any comprehensive school does not prejudice the continuance of any existing 
selective  secondary  school’  [3].  Richmond-upon-Thames,  meanwhile,  produced  a 
draft plan that merely involved the enlargement and improvement of its secondary 
modern  schools  which  were  to  be  re-named  ‘comprehensives’,  while  gradually 
reducing  grammar  school  intakes  to  20  per  cent  [4].  The  Campaign  for  the 
Advancement of State Education (CASE) took it upon itself to expose LEAs that were 
‘finding ways of defeating the intention of reorganisation by continuing selection in 
various  forms  or  by schemes  which  they know cannot  be  implemented  for  many 
years’ [5]. 
As Shadow Secretary of State for Education between 1964 and 1969 Edward Boyle 
found himself in an increasingly uncomfortable position. He personally hoped to see 
‘many more comprehensive schools’ replacing ‘market town’ grammars  (quoted in 
The  Times,  8  April  1965),  but  such  statements  served  only  to  antagonize  local 
grammar school preservation groups and Conservative backbenchers. Comprehensive 
education, Boyle argued, was an issue to be resolved at the local, rather than national, 
level  and  he  pointed  out  that,  in  many  localities,  Conservative  enthusiasm  for 
comprehensives  surpassed  that  of  their  political  opponents  (Crook,  1993,  p.  54). 
Boyle  had  been  initially  attracted  to  tiered  secondary  reorganization  solutions  by 
following the Leicestershire experiment and reading the arguments of Robin Pedley 
(Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p. 21). The West Riding pilot subsequently persuaded him that 
middle  school  schemes  were  preferable,  though  he  endorsed  the  view that  LEAs 
should await Lady Plowden’s report before finalising their plans for the three tiers 
(The Teacher, 4 June 1965). 
As anticipated,  the  Plowden Report  (DES,  1967) did  endorse middle  schools  and 
further recommended that children should transfer at the ages of eight and 12. Middle 
school  comprehensive  schemes  had  a  particular  appeal  to  Conservative-controlled 
authorities  seeking  to  abolish  the  eleven-plus  without  creating  ‘monster’ 
comprehensive  schools.  By  mid-1967  Merton,  Oxford  and  Wallasey  LEAs  had 
announced  plans  to  abandon  the  eleven-plus  and  to  introduce  three-tier  schemes 
(Crook, 1993, p. 56). Southampton followed soon afterwards (TES, 31 May 1968) and 
in June 1968 the  TES listed some further 21 comprehensive schemes that had been 
approved by the DES (TES, 7 June 1968). The Labour government had real grounds 
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for satisfaction with its ‘softly softly’ approach of persuasion rather than legislation. 
Instead of focusing on its success, however, Ted Short, the-then Secretary of State for 
Education, was targeting those LEAs – around 20 out of 146 - that had not responded 
to Circular 10/65. A parliamentary bill was prepared during the final months of 1969, 
only to be withdrawn when Harold Wilson objected to its wording (diary entry,  9 
December 1969 in Benn, 1988, p. 218). 
Since the Second World War the education system for England and Wales was widely 
referred to as ‘a central service locally administered’.  But Short’s determination to 
legislate marked a watershed for central and local government relations in education 
and ended the DES’s cordial relationship with the AEC (Cooke and Gosden, 1986, p. 
80). In March 1969 Keith Robinson, CEO for Southport, a Tory-controlled ‘laggard’ 
LEA that had formulated only an interim plan, complained to the AEC Secretary, Sir 
William Alexander,  that  his  Education  Committee  was  prepared  to  challenge  the 
Secretary of State, explaining
My  Authority  maintained  its  reluctance  to  define  an  ultimate,  fully 
comprehensive  scheme.  They  did  not  declare  themselves  against 
comprehensive education in principle but took the view that they wanted 
further  opportunity to  evaluate  various  schemes  and keep their  options 
open. . . . It seems clear from informal discussions with the Department of 
Education and Science that they are now taking the line that they require 
the Authority to commit itself to a  specific fully comprehensive scheme 
before my secondary school building projects can be considered. . . . I fear 
.  .  .  that  my  Authority  is  going  to  take  a  dim  view  of  the  present 
Department of Education and Science attitude. The word ‘blackmail’ will 
spring readily to the lips of my elected members who will want to fight. 
[6]
Alexander urged Short to reconsider, contending that legislation was unnecessary and 
likely to harm, rather than accelerate the drive for comprehensive education. It was an 
argument that fell upon deaf ears. Short’s reply indicated that while he valued LEA 
freedoms, these ‘can scarcely include the possibility of frustrating national policy’ [7]. 
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But  again the  bill  did not  proceed into  law at  this  point,  becoming a casualty  of 
Wilson’s decision to call a general election.
One of the first decisions of Short’s Conservative successor, Margaret Thatcher, was 
to  publish Circular  10/70,  effectively  withdrawing  Labour’s  circular  of  five  years 
earlier. The Circular stated that ‘Authorities will now be freer to determine the shape 
of secondary provision in their areas’ (DES, 1970). The immediate effect was that a 
number of Conservative councils  halted their  reorganization plans and referred the 
question back to their education committees. Most decided subsequently to proceed, 
however.  Indeed,  Richmond-on-Thames,  which  had  held  out  against 
comprehensivization  in  the  late  1960s  surprisingly  reversed  its  policy  during 
Thatcher’s  period  (1970-74)  at  the  DES  (Kerckhoff  et  al,  1996,  p.  36),  while 
Conservative-controlled Leeds pressed ahead with its three-tier, fully comprehensive 
scheme  (Fenwick  and  Woodthorpe,  1980).  The  DES now discontinued  its  earlier 
practice  of  giving  administrative  approval  to  non-statutory  plans.  Instead,  the 
Secretary of State used the powers invested in her under Section 13 of the 1944 Act to 
judge the merits of closure or re-designation proposals affecting individual schools. 
Contrary to the wording of Circular 10/70 Thatcher actually demonstrated rather more 
inclination to interfere with LEA proposals than any of her predecessors by ‘saving’ 
some 94 grammar schools that had been identified for re-designation and by rejecting 
the views of the majority of petitioners in Kidderminster and Barnet. Even so, she was 
unable to halt what she later called the ‘universal comprehensive thing’ (interview in 
the  Daily Mail, 13 May 1987, quoted in Chitty, 1989, pp. 54-55). More than 1,400 
comprehensive (including middle) schools were established between 1970 and 1974, 
many of which were located in Conservative LEAs. Thus, Margaret Thatcher presided 
over  the  creation  of  more  comprehensives  than  any  other  Secretary  of  State  for 
Education.
POLITICAL AND PERSONNEL FACTORS
The type of secondary reorganization scheme that a particular LEA sought to adopt or 
implement depended greatly upon the ideas and actions of individuals and groups. A 
change of local council control naturally precipitated a change of personnel on the 
Education  Committee  and  sometimes  introduced  new  thinking  about  secondary 
reorganization. Early political support for comprehensive education was to be found 
12
in some of the large cities, notably Bristol, London and Manchester. In May 1952, 
after victory at the polls, Bristol’s Labour group declared that its policy to develop 
comprehensive schools across the city would eventually ‘transform the educational 
system of Bristol from an instrument perpetuating class distinctions into an instrument 
for promoting social  unity’  [8].  But not all  local  Labour groups were enthusiastic 
about  comprehensive  education  in  the  immediate  post-war  years.  Many  Socialist 
politicians,  often  themselves  the  beneficiaries  of  a  grammar-school  education, 
continued to express confidence in bipartism well  into the 1960s (Kerckhoff et al, 
1996, p. 164). 
It is far from clear whether strong political enthusiasm for comprehensive education 
quickened  the  pace  of  reorganization.  Some  ‘progressive’  LEAs,  such  as 
Leicestershire  and  the  West  Riding,  were  constrained  by  demography  and  the 
suitability of buildings,  while issues relating  to voluntary and direct  grant  schools 
hampered the pace of change in larger cities like Birmingham, Bristol and London. 
LEA  case  studies  reveal  the  significance  of  individual  politicians  involved  in 
reorganization at the local level. In Stoke-on-Trent, for example, Bob Cant, Labour 
Chairman of the Education Committee and subsequently a city MP, drove the process 
of  comprehensivization,  while  the  energy and influence  over  many years  of  Lady 
Shena Simon (Manchester) and the Reverend Frederick Vyvyan-Jones (Bristol) was 
equally notable. In Leeds the Conservative Councillor Patrick Crotty demonstrated a 
degree of interest in education untypical of his party colleagues. He played a key role 
in  marketing  the  three-tier  scheme  to  Leeds  Conservatives  as  a  means  of  re-
orientating the grammar schools without destroying them (Fenwick and Woodthorpe, 
1980, p. 24). When strong political direction was absent, the checks and balances of 
local democracy often preserved the  status quo. Instructed by their borough, city or 
county council to draw up proposals for the abolition of the eleven-plus, education 
committees sometimes sent the answer that they were satisfied with existing selection 
measures. But when proposals were drawn up, the full council sometimes rejected 
these.  Even when there  was agreement  that  comprehensives  should be introduced 
disagreements could break out over the best means of reorganizing. 
The role of CEOs - and sometimes,  as in West Sussex and Northumberland, their 
deputies (Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p.168) - was in many instances crucial in challenging 
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old  orthodoxies.  Nowhere  is  this  clearer  than  in  the  capital.  For  almost  30  years 
London’s  dynasty  of  Education  Officers  –  Sir  Graham Savage,  John  Brown,  Sir 
William Houghton and Dr Eric Briault – reaffirmed the basic principles of the London 
School Plan and of 11-18 schools. The arrival of Peter Newsam, initially as Briault’s 
deputy and then his successor encouraged more lateral thinking during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Newsam’s enthusiasm for the three-tier  system that he had helped to 
implement  in  the  West  Riding,  where  he  had  worked  under  Clegg,  won  over 
influential Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) members. Without Newsam’s 
vision the reorganization of London secondary schools would probably have halted in 
the mid-1970s (Kerckhoff et al, 1996, pp. 79-80).
The relationship between CEOs and local politicians could be tense. During the early 
1950s Lady Shena Simon became frustrated by Manchester CEO Norman Fisher’s 
disinclination to support tripartism. When Fisher left the LEA to take up another post 
in 1955 she set out her expectations of the new post-holder to a colleague:
The Chief official ought to be prepared to carry out whatever policy the 
committee  decided  upon,  but  we  have  had  recent  experience  of  how, 
without apparent opposition – the official can obstruct.
(Lady Simon to Alderman Sir Maurice Pariser, 7 March 1955, quoted in 
Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p. 86)
These hopes were to be frustrated. Relations between Manchester’s Labour politicians 
and Fisher’s successor, John Elliot, were strained at the best of times and when the 
reorganization plans were finalized, shortly before the publication of Circular 10/65, it 
was  reported  that  Elliot  was  ‘merely  informed’  of  them  (TES,  28  May  1965). 
Birmingham’s CEO, Sir Lionel Russell,  found it  impossible  to satisfy his political 
masters from both major parties. Despite producing plan after plan, objections were 
persistently  raised concerning the future of the King Edward foundation grammar 
schools and the absence of suitable sites for all-through comprehensives. Even Alec 
Clegg,  arguably the most  dynamic  and influential  CEO of  his  generation,  did not 
escape  political  censure  in  the  West  Riding.  Here,  the  peculiarities  of  semi-
autonomous excepted districts militated against the kind of comprehensive uniformity 
that he wished to see (Gosden and Sharp, 1978, pp. 181, 184-85, 190). 
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By contrast,  many county CEOs enjoyed considerable  freedoms.  In Conservative-
controlled Leicestershire there was an acceptance, which was only displaced during 
the 1970s, that Stewart Mason and his County Hall colleagues were best placed to 
make decisions about the form and structure of secondary education. Every decision 
relating to the Leicestershire experiment and plan came before the county’s School 
Organization and Staffing Committee whose agendas and operations were controlled 
by  Mason  himself.  Leicestershire  Education  Committee  and  the  County  Council 
subsequently  endorsed  the  recommendations  of  this  committee  without  debate  or 
question. 
CONSULTATION AND REORGANIZATION
The consultation practices of LEAs varied greatly, sometimes providing grounds for 
bitter  complaint.  Different  perspectives  about  the  adequacy  or  otherwise  of 
consultation characterized the comprehensive debate from its earliest days. Stewart 
Mason maintained, for example, that the Leicestershire experiment was launched in 
1957 with the full co-operation of primary,  secondary modern and grammar school 
heads (Mason, 1965, p. 53). But this does not accord with the recollections of the two 
grammar school heads. In 1981 one remembered that ‘It was just sprung upon us’, 
while  the  other  explained  that,  upon hearing  of  the  Director’s  plans  on  a  Friday 
evening, he personally visited each member of his staff on the following day to ensure 
that they did not hear the news first from the local press (Jones, 1988, pp. 61-62). 
In respect of its consultation arrangements Bristol LEA achieved the greatest notoriety 
during  the  mid-1960s.  The  city’s  1964  plan  controversially  sought  to  establish 
‘neighbourhood’ comprehensive schools by means of a ‘zoning’ process. The LEA 
also announced that it would discontinue the practice of purchasing free places in the 
city’s seven direct grant schools so as to ensure that the comprehensives would recruit 
their  fair  share  of  high-achieving  secondary-age  children.  A strong  attack  on  the 
Bristol  proposals  was  mounted  by the  Secondary  Education  Defence  Association, 
which also developed as a national organization on the right wing of the Conservative 
Party  (Crook,  1993,  p.  55),  and  by  the  Bristol  Evening  Post.  In  June  1965  the 
newspaper published a highly-critical report by Professor Boris Ford. Having studied 
the evidence, Ford concluded that neighbourhood comprehensives were more likely to 
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prevent, rather than enhance a diversity of intake. He also asserted that the LEA ‘has 
gone forward with astonishingly little  detailed  study,  research  experiment,  testing, 
redesigning which would have seemed essential in so large a project’ (Bristol Evening 
Post, 23 June 1965). In general, it  seems that lessons were learnt from the Bristol 
controversy. The ILEA, which assumed the LCC’s education powers in April 1965, 
was particularly anxious that public discussion should precede its formal response to 
Circular 10/65. Thus, between December 1966 and February of the following year 
some 42 public meetings were held, attended by more than 19,000 parents (Kerckhoff 
et al, 1996, p. 71). Most LEAs, meanwhile, routinely co-opted head teachers and/or 
teachers  to reorganization working parties,  a practice that Edward Short sought to 
formalise in a 1968 circular (TES, 23 August 1968). 
A close eye  was kept on LEAs’ consultation  arrangements  by the various teacher 
unions and associations, although they were interested principally in their members’ 
conditions of service and career prospects. Where mergers were proposed there were 
understandable concerns that women teachers might lose out to men and that non-
graduates would be disadvantaged. Associations with large memberships working in 
grammar schools tended to be the most outspoken. Immediately after Labour’s 1964 
general election victory, for example, E.C. Axford, Headmaster of Ossett Grammar 
School,  drafted  a  confidential  memorandum  for  his  fellow  members  on  the 
Incorporated Association of Head Masters (IAHM) executive, entitled ‘Now Labour 
Is  In’.  He  urged  the  IAHM  to  adopt  a  policy  of  vigilance  and  resistance  to 
unsatisfactory  LEA  schemes,  pointing  to  their  recent  success  in  forcing  the 
abandonment of a reorganization proposal from Flintshire LEA [9].
Gauging the strength of community feeling towards comprehensive  education was 
difficult,  because those parents  who joined such organizations  as the non-political 
CASE or the left-of-centre Comprehensive Schools Committee (CSC) were no more 
typical  than  those  who  marched  against  grammar  school  closures.  But  Tyrrell 
Burgess, a journalist, academic and member of the ILEA could find little fault with 
local  democratic  processes  when  he  wrote  to  Boyle,  the  opposition  front  bench 
Education spokesman in June 1967:
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I’ve now had the chance to look at  innumerable  plans,  and I  honestly 
cannot say that there is much evidence of haste and muddle. They have 
been  pondering  it,  most  of  them,  for  two  years  or  more!  And  it  will 
scarcely help to retain public confidence and interest in local government 
if leading politicians keep making sweeping accusations of incompetence, 
especially since these are not justified.
In the second place, it ignores the astonishing ability and common 
sense in the Department of Education and Science now devoted to this 
issue. I suppose it can be argued that this particular social revolution is 
almost  wholly  due  to  political  and  administrative  intelligence  in  the 
schools branch.
In the third place, complaints about haste in this simply feed the 
national neurosis that no change should ever be made in less than half a 
century. The debate on comprehensive schools has been going on for two 
decades, such schools have been running all over the country for nearly as 
long, plans have taken two years and exhaustive consultations to prepare, 
they  will  take  until  the  1970s to  put  into  effect.  Scarcely evidence  of 
headlong and impulsive speed! [10]
Many of the anxieties about LEA proposals were pragmatic, rather than ideological. 
How would catchment areas be defined? Did middle school arrangements mean that 
eight-  or  nine-year-old  pupils  have  long  journeys  or  busy  roads  to  cross?  Were 
schools adequately equipped with such facilities as laboratories and libraries? Were 
school  canteens  and dining  rooms  geared  up to  serve  more  than  1,000 lunchtime 
meals? Did former grammar school staff need further training to teach comprehensive 
school pupils? 
CONCLUSIONS
The drive for comprehensive education in England and Wales was a ‘bottom up’, 
rather than ‘top down’ initiative. During the late 1940s the same Labour government 
that oversaw the creation of the National Health Service and the establishment of the 
Welfare State pursued a far from radical secondary education policy. Indeed, it has 
been  suggested  that  the  conservatism of  Ellen  Wilkinson  and  George  Tomlinson 
stunted the growth of the comprehensive school movement by 20 years (Rubinstein, 
17
1979,  p.  161).  A  growing  number  of  LEAs  felt  uncomfortable  with  eleven-plus 
selection during the 1950s, particularly because of the effects of what Stewart Mason 
termed the ‘deadening backwash’ upon primary schools (Mason, 1965, p. 52). LEAs 
controlled by both of the major political parties experimented with different selection 
procedures,  sometimes  as  a  first  step  towards  the  objective  of  establishing 
comprehensive education throughout the administrative area. 
The London School Plan influenced early conceptions of the comprehensive school, 
but the vision it set out was essentially urban in character. It had an appeal to LEAs 
like Bristol, Liverpool and Manchester, which were in the vanguard of what Simon 
terms  the  ‘breakout’.  But  other  local  initiatives  were  of  still  greater  importance, 
because  they  suggested  that  selection  could  be  ended without  the  construction  of 
large, all-through institutions. In advance of Circular 10/65 Croydon, Doncaster and 
Leicestershire LEAs each gave their names to two-tier patterns that delayed selection, 
while the 1964 Education Act ushered in fully comprehensive arrangements in parts 
of the West Riding.  With LEAs taking the lead,  there was no strong case for the 
Labour government to legislate in favour of comprehensive education in 1965. The 
rationale  for  abandoning the approach of  persuasion in  favour of compulsion  was 
scarcely stronger four years later when Ted Short persuaded the Wilson cabinet to 
support  his  ‘zero  tolerance’  approach.  The  Plowden  report  had,  by  this  time, 
stimulated  an  interest  in  secondary  reorganization  from  LEAs  that  had  initially 
resisted Circular 10/65 and DES officials were so overwhelmed with paperwork from 
compliant  authorities  that  they  were  seeking  summary  updates  from  the  CSC 
(Kerckhoff et al, 1996, p. 29). 
The winter and early spring of 1969-70 marked the beginning of the end of the post-
war  partnership  in  education  between  central  and  local  government.  Short’s 
misjudgement contributed to this, but he was not wholly responsible. Edward Boyle’s 
departure from politics in 1969 symbolized the end of an old order of politicians who 
had unsuccessfully sought to prevent education from becoming a political football. 
His successor as Shadow Education Secretary, Margaret Thatcher, was more in tune 
with the ‘Black Paper’ thinking that was to significantly influence future Conservative 
Party policy. DES relations with CEOs and Education Committee chairs cooled after 
1970, while Thatcher became the patron of grammar school preservation groups. 
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The  project  of  comprehensive  education,  which  LEAs  had  begun,  was  never 
completed,  nor  did  it  advance  sufficiently  to  be  fairly  judged (Crook,  Power  and 
Whitty, 1999). When Labour re-introduced its request for comprehensive plans from 
selective LEAs in 1974 Secretary of State Fred Mulley faced defiance from seven 
Conservative  authorities  while  another,  Tameside,  decided  to  withdraw  the 
comprehensive  plan  submitted  by  its  Labour  predecessors.  The  Tameside  dispute 
ended  in  a  1975 High Court  adjudication  against  Mulley,  who retaliated  with  an 
Education  Act  –  subsequently  repealed  by  Margaret  Thatcher’s  government  – 
requiring  the  submission  of  reorganization  proposals  from  still-selective  LEAs 
(Crook,  Power and Whitty,  1999,  pp.  15-16).  By this  time,  however,  the national 
education landscape was changing. The ‘Great Debate’ of the late 1970s shifted the 
focus  away  from  structures  and  towards  the  issues  of  standards,  curriculum  and 
teacher training. Subsequently, in the name of ‘choice’ and ‘diversity’ LEAs lost their 
monopoly of control over schools and school systems. Indeed, under New Labour’s 
strict grammar school ballot regulations they have even lost their right to participate in 
the kind of debates that gave comprehensive reorganization a democratic flavour.
Correspondence: David Crook, History and Philosophy Group, University of London 
Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, UK.
NOTES
[1] The joint Leicester University- Duke University (North Carolina) project was 
entitled  ‘When  a  society  changes  its  school  system:  the  introduction  of 
comprehensive schools in Great Britain’ between 1991 and 1993 and produced 
a  major  book  (Kerckhoff  et  al,  1996).  Thanks  are  due  to  the  Spencer 
Foundation and to the custodians of the primary source materials listed below.
[2] University  of  Leeds,  Boyle  Papers,  MS  660/25217,  briefing  paper  headed 
‘Prime Minister’, 3 July 1963.
[3] University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, CASE archives, MSS 236/3 
South Bucks file, memorandum of 24 November 1966.
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[4] University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, CASE archives, MSS 236/3, 
Richmond  file,  ‘An  account  of  the  campaign  against  selection  at  11+  in 
Richmond-upon-Thames’ by Joan Sallis (1970).
[5] University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, CASE archives, MSS 236/3, 
‘Report of the Committee for the Year ended 31st July 1966’.
[6] University of Leeds, AEC papers, A1113, Robinson to Alexander, 17 March 
1969.
[7] University of Leeds, AEC papers, A1113, Short to Alexander, 26 March 1970.
[8] Bristol Records Office, Education Committee Labour Group minutes, 21 May 
1952.
[9] University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, IAHM archives, MSS 58/3/1, 
Liverpool  file  2,  draft  memorandum  sent  to  the  IAHM  President,  E.H. 
Goddard with a note, 16 October 1964. 
[10] University of Leeds, Boyle Papers MS 660/2582, Burgess to Boyle, 21 June 
1967.
REFERENCES
BENN, T. (1988) Office Without Power: Diaries 1968-72 (London, Hutchinson).
CHINN,  W.  (1965)  Coventry,  in:  S.  MACLURE  (Ed.)  Comprehensive  Planning 
(London, Councils and Education Press).
CHITTY,  C.  (1989)  Towards  a  New Education  System:  The  Victory  of  the  New  
Right? (London, Falmer).
CLEGG, A. (1965) West Riding, in: S. MACLURE (Ed.)  Comprehensive Planning 
(London, Councils and Education Press).
COOKE, G. & P. GOSDEN (1986)  Education Committees (Harlow, Councils  and 
Education Press/Longman).
20
CROOK, D. (1992) The disputed origins of the Leicestershire two-tier comprehensive 
schools plan, History of Education Society Bulletin, 50, pp. 55-59.
CROOK,  D.  (1993)  Edward  Boyle:  Conservative  champion  of  comprehensives?, 
History of Education, 22, 1, pp. 49-62.
CROOK, D., S. POWER & G. WHITTY (1999) The Grammar School Question: A  
Review of research on Comprehensive and Selective Education (London, Institute of 
Education).
DEAN,  D.  (1998)  Circular  10/65  revisited:  the  Labour  government  and  the 
‘comprehensive revolution’ in 1964-1965, Paedagogica Historica 34, 1, pp. 63-91.
DEPARTMENT  OF  EDUCATION  AND  SCIENCE  (1965)  The  Organisation  of  
Secondary Education (Circular 10/65), 14 July (London, DES).
DEPARTMENT  OF  EDUCATION  AND  SCIENCE  (1967)  Children  and  Their  
Primary Schools  (Plowden Report) (London, HMSO).
DEPARTMENT  OF  EDUCATION  AND  SCIENCE  (1970)  The  Organisation  of  
Secondary Education (Circular 10/70), 30 June (London, DES).
DIBDEN,  H.  (1965)  Stoke-on-Trent,  in:  S.  MACLURE  (Ed.)  Comprehensive  
Planning (London, Councils and Education Press).
FENWICK,  I.  &  A.  WOODTHORPE  (1980)  The  reorganisation  of  secondary 
education in Leeds: the role of committee chairmen and political parties,  Aspects of  
Education, 22, pp. 18-28.
GOSDEN, P. & SHARP, P. (1978) The Development of an Education Service in the  
West Riding, 1889-1974 (Oxford, Martin Robertson).
21
JONES, D.  (1988)  Stewart  Mason: The Art of  Education (London,  Lawrence  and 
Wishart).
KEEN, R. (1965) Comprehensive reorganisation in Bristol, Forum 8, 1, pp. 22-26.
KERCKHOFF,  A.,  K.  FOGELMAN,  D.  CROOK  & D.  REEDER (1996)  Going 
Comprehensive in England and Wales: A Study of Uneven Change (London, Woburn 
Press).
LAWRENCE,  I.  (1993)  Power  and Politics  at  the  Department  of  Education  and  
Science (London, Cassell).
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (1947)  London School Plan: A Development Plan  
for Primary and Secondary Education (London, LCC).
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (1961)  London Comprehensive Schools (London, 
LCC).
MASON, S. (1965) Leicestershire, in: S. MACLURE (Ed.) Comprehensive Planning 
(London, Councils and Education Press).
MILES,  M.  (1964)  The  comprehensive  idea:  fears  allayed  in  ten  changing years, 
Times Educational Supplement, 14 February.
MINISTRY  OF  EDUCATION  (1945)  The  Nation’s  Schools,  Their  Plans  and  
Purposes (Pamphlet 1) (London, HMSO).
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1947)  The New Secondary Education (Pamphlet 9) 
(London, 1947).
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1958)  Secondary Education for All:  A New Drive 
(London, HMSO).
PEDLEY, R. (1980) Leicestershire legacy, Education 30 May.
22
RUBINSTEIN, D. (1979) Ellen Wilkinson re-considered,  History Workshop, 7, pp. 
161-69.
SIMON, B. (1991)  Education and the Social Order, 1940-1990 (London, Lawrence 
and Wishart).
STEWART, M. (1980) Life and Labour: An Autobiography (London, Sidgwick and 
Jackson).
VERNON, P. (Ed.) (1957) Secondary School Selection (London, Methuen).
YATES,  A.  &  D.  PIDGEON  (1957)  Admission  to  Grammar  Schools (London, 
National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales).
23
